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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the dismissal of appellant's
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District
Court.

Jurisdiction lies in this Court under Utah Code Ann.

S 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987)(Supp. 1988) because the conviction which
caused the incarceration of which petitioner complains was for a
first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether petitioner is procedurally barred from

seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus by raising matters in the
petition that he raised or should have raised on his direct
appeal.
2.

Whether petitioner's trial and appellate counsel

rendered ineffective assistance.
3.

Whether the prosecutor in petitioner's trial

committed misconduct in his closing arguments and whether he
withheld exculpatory evidence from petitioner before trial.

4.

Whether petitioner's additional claims raised in

his supplemental brief, that he was denied access to the courts
and that the trial judge was prejudiced, have any merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondents rely on the
following provisions:
1.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1978).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was charged with criminal homicide, murder
in the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann, S 76-5-203 (1978).

He was convicted as charged in a

jury trial held February 26,27,28, and March 1, 1985, in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.

Petitioner was

sentenced by Judge Frederick on March 25, 1985, to the Utah State
Prison for a term of not less than five years and may be for
life.

Petitioner appealed that conviction and sentence to this

Court in 1985 in case number 20629.

The issues raised in that

appeal were (1) ineffective assistance by trial counsel because
she failed to object to the court giving a supplemental "Allen"
instruction; (2) reversible error by the trial court in giving
the "Allen" instruction; (3) insufficient evidence to support the
guilty verdict; and (4) reversible error by the trial court in
allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable
witness to be read into evidence at trial.

This Court upheld

petitioner's conviction in State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah
1987).

On November 5, 1987, petitioner filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his incarceration.

Even though

in this circumstance such a petition should be for PostConviction Relief, respondents will use the title given it by
petitioner for the purposes of this brief.

The case was assigned

to the Honorable Frank G. Noel of the Third Judicial District
Court.

An evidentiary hearing was held in the matter on March

25, 1988/ at which time petitioner called no witnesses and did
not take the stand himself.

The matter was argued by petitioner

pro se and by an Assistant Attorney General but no sworn
testimony or evidence was presented.

Subsequent to the hearing,

petitioner filed several "affidavits" and "supplemental
traverses" in an attempt to support his claims.

On October 20,

1988, Judge Noel signed an Order dismissing petitioner's habeas
corpus petition.

On October 21, 1988, petitioner filed an

objection to Judge Noel's Memorandum Decision; on October 28,
1988/ petitioner filed a Motion for a Certificate of Probable
Cause, a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel/ and a Notice of
Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In this statement/ citations to the trial record are to
the page numbers stamped on as the record numbers/ not to the
reporter's pagination.
On the afternoon of Saturday/ March 31/ 19849 George
Givens/ also known as Greg Givens (Trial R. 691) # met Rickey
Myers in downtown Salt Lake City.

Myers was walking in the city#

sight-seeing (Trial R. 381). He had arrived in Salt Lake City
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the previous Wednesday (Trial R. 380) or Thursday (Trial R. 504).
Givens told Myers of a nearby party that he was going to and
asked Myers to come along (Trial R. 381). The two walked from
the downtown area to Myers' truck (Trial R. 383), which was
parked near the Holiday Inn at Redwood Road and North Temple
(Trial R. 458).
When they arrived at the party, which was in a duplex
rented by Mike O'Mara (Trial R. 199-200,385), they discovered
that there was another party next door (Trial R. 387). The party
at Mike O'Mara's was attended by high school age youth (Trial R.
387).

The other party, in Pete Najera's half of the duplex

(Trial R. 228), was attended by people ofvarying ages (Trial R.
345).

Myers felt more comfortable at Najera's party so he stayed

there (Trial R. 387-8).

Givens, meanwhile, went back and forth

to both parties, which caused some minor resentment in
petitioner's cousin at Najera's party (Trial R. 397).
Petitioner was also at Najera's party (Trial R. 241,
261, 344, 388, 606). He arrived at about 10:30 p.m. (Trial R.
255, 606) with his second cousin, Leonard Fernandez (Trial R.
257).

Petitioner and Fernandez left after about fifteen minutes

and went to La Frontera cafe until about 1:00 a.m. (Trial R.
607).

They then returned to Najera's party (Trial R. 609).

There was no apparent dispute or trouble between petitioner and
Givens during the party (Trial R. 231, 169, 347, 397).
Myers met petitioner at the party and got close enough
to see him, identify him (Trial R. 498), and remember him (Trial
R. 388-9).

While at the party, Myers drank some beer but never

-A-

-arrived at a state of intoxication or drunkenness" (Trial R.
389-90).

The party Mwas slowing down" at about 3:30 a.m. (Trial

R. 401-2) so Myers and Givens decided to leave (Trial R. 402).
Myers testified that he and Givens left the party
through the front door of Najera's duplex (Trial R. 404). As
Myers went through the door he saw "three gentlemen that opened
the door" (Trial R. 405). The men were Givens, petitioner, and
someone Myers recognized but did not know the name of (Trial R.
405); however, Myers later identified him as Gilbert Najera or
his brother, Steven Najera (Trial R. 424), who look very much
alike (Trial R. 368, 468, 493). Petitioner claimed that he left
with Leonard Fernandez prior to the shooting (Trial R. 615).
Gilbert Najera also testified that petitioner left prior to the
shooting (Trial R. 350-1).

Fernandez testified that he left with

petitioner (Trial R. 285) and that he did not hear a shot but he
did see a body slumped over in the entry way (Trial R. 285, 305).
He did not see a bullet hole or blood (Trial R. 305), but the
body made no noise nor did it move (Trial R. 318). Furthermore,
because Fernandez was wearing dark glasses he could not tell
whether the body was a black or a white man (Trial R. 306).
Petitioner testified that he saw no one lying in the entry way
when he left with Fernandez (Trial R. 615).
Myers testified that he came out of the door, shook
petitioner's hand and thanked him for the good time and started
toward his truck (Trial R. 409). Myers then glanced back to tell
petitioner something and saw petitioner advance toward Givens
(Trial R. 410). Petitioner, with a motion of his right hand
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coming from his belt, said something like, "When you see your
friends over there, give them this" (Trial R. 410). Myers then
saw a muzzle flash from a revolver (Trial R. 410, 412) and saw
Givens shot in the head (Trial R. 415). The revolver sounded
like it was in the .30 caliber range (Trial R. 412) although
Myers could only see that it was a blue steel revolver, and could
not see the size of caliber it was (Trial R. 412). Petitioner
then turned toward Myers, pointed the gun at him and asked
something to the effect, "Would you like some of this, too?"
(Trial R. 413). Myers turned and ran from the scene (Trial R.
413).

He did not go to his truck because he simply wanted to get

out of the area and did not think of going to his truck (Trial R.
414).
Myers ran a short distance (Trial R. 413) then walked
(Trial R. 453). He came to the railroad tracks (Trial R. 450)
and followed them back downtown, walked to the bus depot, waited
four or five minutes and then called the police (Trial R. 418).
The police came to the bus depot and took him to the police
station (Trial R. 419). Officer Opheikens, who picked Myers up
at the bus depot, stated that Myers showed signs of shock and was
"visibly shaken up and he rambled on the same as somebody who had
been in a serious accident and had been shaken up, the same type
behavior in his mannerisms" (Trial R. 531). Myers looked at 30
to 40 photographs to identify who was with petitioner when he
shot Givens in the head (Trial R. 423, 491).
Officer John Johnson was assigned to the case and went
to petitioner'8 home with Lieutenant Leonard and Detective Jim

Leary to arrest petitioner concerning the homicide (Trial R.
516).

While Johnson was at petitioner's home he asked, and

received, permission to search petitioner's car for a Hgun or
bullets, anything related to the shooting" (Trial R. 479).
Johnson "found one live round of .38 caliber ammunition on the
floorboard" of the front passenger side of the vehicle he
searched (Trial R. 480). The bullet had a solid lead slug that
was unjacketed (Trial R. 480).
At trial, petitioner testified that the bullet was
dropped in his car in late February or early March when he went
target practicing with a snubnose (Trial R. 636) .38 caliber
pistol (Trial R. 596). Petitioner said he borrowed the gun from
his nephew (Trial R. 630), Jonathan Twittle (Trial R. 637). One
of petitioner's cousins, Willie Moore, testified that he and
petitioner had gone target shooting in early 1984 and had gone in
petitioner's black Chevy Chevelle and may have dropped some
shells in the car (Trial R. 596-7).

Moore also testified that

petitioner had talked to him about testifying about the target
shooting in the summer of 1984 (Trial R. 597). Petitioner
testified that the car he was driving the night of the homicide
was a black 1972 Chevrolet Chevelle (Trial R. 607), but
introduced into evidence the registration for a Chevelle Malibu
(Trial R. 608). He testified that he owned three other
automobiles (Trial R. 617). Petitioner's cousin, Leonard
Fernandez, testified that petitioner was driving a 1971 Chevelle
with no damage on it that night and that the car was a Super
Sport with a "CS or SS" on the body (Trial R. 93-94).
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The

officer testified that he searched a black 1974 Chevrolet Monte
Carlo and recalled that it was unlocked when he searched (Trial
R. 479). Another officer who was present during the search also
testified that the vehicle searched was a black Chevrolet Monte
Carlo (Trial R. 516).
After the habeas corpus hearing, at which no sworn
evidence was given, petitioner submitted "affidavits" saying that
he had not been aware that the car searched was a Monte Carlo
(Habeas R. 267-68, 352-53).

He also sent "affidavits"

purportedly from a Mark Velarde that a 1974 Monte Carlo which
Velarde is "almost 100% sure" was parked at petitioner's house on
April 1, 1984, belonged to a friend of Velarde's.

The

"affidavits" state that Velarde didn't know petitioner on April
1, 1984, but he would have testified for him (Habeas R. 270-71,
280-82, 289-90).

None of these "affidavits" was executed before

a subscribing witness.
After the hearing, petitioner also submitted
"affidavits" of his cousin, Chris Leonard Fernandez, who had
testified at his trial, that the prosecution's rebuttal witness
had a vendetta against petitioner's cousin's family (Habeas R.
283-84).

He also submitted -affidavits" from a Lorenzo Tuero who

claims to be a part-time disc jockey at the Annex Bar where he
never recalled seeing petitioner, and to have been employed at La
Frontera and to have seen petitioner there often.

The

"affidavit" states that Tuero never saw petitioner socializing
with Eli Archuleta, the State's rebuttal witness (Habeas R. 35256).

Finally, petitioner submitted "affidavits" from Ronald
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Craig Warren who claims to have been incarcerated with both
petitioner and Archuleta at the Utah State Prison and to have
heard Archuleta say that he had lied at petitioner's trial
(Habeas R. 363-70).

Again, none of these "affidavits" were

executed before a subscribing witness.

None of the people who

supposedly prepared these "affidavits" were called to testify at
petitioner's habeas hearing (Habeas R. 264).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner has taken a direct appeal from his
conviction and does not now raise any issues which were not or
could not have been raised in that appeal.
Petitioner's claim of a violation of his constitutional
rights is not supported by the record of either his trial or his
habeas hearing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
PETITIONER COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL
ISSUES CONCERNING HIS CONVICTION ON HIS
INITIAL DIRECT APPEAL.
Petitioner asserts that the District Court erred in
dismissing his habeas corpus petition.

This assertion is

roeritless.
It is well settled law in Utah that if alleged errors
could have been raised on direct appeal, this Court is "precluded
under basic principles of appellate review from addressing them
now," Bundy v. Deland# 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988).

In stating

a post-conviction claim, a petitioner must allege an "obvious
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right in the trial of a matter;. . .H Ld.
-9-

This Court in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah
1983), clearly emphasized the standard for habeas corpus review;
It is therefore well settled in this state
that allegations of error that could have
been but were not raised on appeal from a
criminal conviction cannot be raised by
habeas corpus or postconviction review,
except in unusual circumstances.
A much-quoted statement of the type of
errors that are and are not cognizable by
habeas corpus is the following from this
Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Turner,
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 40 P.2d 968, 969 (1968)
(Crockett, C.J.):
[Habeas corpus] is an extraordinary
remedy which is properly invocable
only when the court had no
jurisdiction over the person or the
offense, or where the requirements
of law have been so disregarded
that the party is substantially and
effectively denied due process of
law, or where some such fact is
shown that it would be
unconscionable not to re-examine
the conviction. If the contention
of error is something which is
known or should be known to the
party at the time the judgment was
entered, it must be reviewed in the
manner and within the time
permitted by regular prescribed
procedure, or the judgment becomes
final and is not subject to further
attack, except in some such unusual
circumstance as we have mentioned
above. Were it otherwise, the
regular rules of procedure
governing appeals and the
limitations of time specified
therein would be rendered impotent.
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1104-05 (bracketed material and
emphasis in original).

The standard of review was further

detailed by this Court in Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1988), as follows:

.in-

On appeal from denial of habeas corpus
relief, "we survey the record in the light
most favorable to the findings and judgment;
and we will not reverse if there is a
reasonable basis therein to support the trial
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ
should be granted."
Id. at 805, quoting Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443
P.2d 1020, 1022 (1968)(citations omitted).

In Codianna, this

Court rejected the argument that ineffective assistance of
counsel necessarily constitutes "unusual circumstances" that
would allow petitioner to bypass the regular appellate process in
favor of habeas corpus.

The Court stated:

To permit the inevitable instances of
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify
for the "unusual circumstances" exception
would allow that exception to swallow up the
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative
appeal mechanism in contravention of the
finality of criminal judgments that is the
settled policy of this state.
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1105.
Likewise, in Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497
P.2d 34 (1972), this Court stated!
He [Zumbrunnen] pursued this petition, after
his time for appeal from the conviction had
expired. He claimed • . • his counsel, who
assisted him at his request, was incompetent.
[This point] could have been urged on a
regular appeal. This court repeatedly has
said the writ cannot be used as a substitute
for such appeal. . .
Id. at 35.
Similarly, in Matthew v. Cook, 754 P.2d 666 (Utah
1988), this Court said that "[plaintiff] did not show cause why
he failed to follow the route of regular appellate procedure and
that he suffered prejudice as a result of his default."
667.
-11-

Icl. at

In Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121
(1967), this Court addressed a similar issue.

In Bryant,

petitioner claimed "that because of this inability to communicate
he was not and could not be represented effectively by counsel."
Id. at 122.

The District Court denied the petition and this

Court affirmed.

.Id. at 122-23.

In discussing the case this

Court said:
This proceeding is an attempt to do that
which should not be done nor countenanced in
our procedure: to turn habeas corpus into an
appellate review. This is not its purpose,
and it is not so intended. The regular steps
of criminal procedure provided for in our law
give adequate protections of the rights of
one accused of crime and safeguards against
conviction of the innocent. They afford full
opportunity to present and have determined
any matters of defense, and to make
objections to any error or impropriety that
may affect his rights. Moreover, after
judgment is entered, there is assured a right
of appeal within the proper time to seek
redress for any such error or transgression
of those rights. When this procedure has
been followed the judgment should normally be
final. It should not be subjected to a
continual merry-go-round of collateral
attacks upon various and specious pretexts as
some courts are prone to permit nowadays. In
our opinion such an inconsiderate attitude
toward final judgments regularly arrived at
by courts of competent jurisdiction robs the
law of the dignity and respect it is entitled
to. It tends to degrade the whole process of
law enforcement and the administration of
justice and thus to undermine the good order
of society it is purposed to maintain.
Id. at 122 (footnotes omitted).
In a case similar to the one at bar, .this Court invoked
the doctrine of waiver or procedural default in affirming the
summary dismissal of a petition claiming ineffective counsel.
Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), the defendant was
_i o_

In

convicted and sentenced to prison.
his conviction was affirmed.

The defendant appealed and

He then sought habeas review and

claimed that his trial attorney "failed to honor his request to
challenge a juror who appellant knew.

[He] also claims that his

trial attorney failed to raise that issue on appeal although
appellant had so requested."

Id. at 876.

Naturally, in his

post-conviction action he claimed "he was denied effective
assistance of counsel. . . "

Ici. The lower court

dismissed his petition on the ground that he
had waived any right to raise the issue of
the failure of his attorney to challenge the
juror. The court determined that it would
not grant an evidentiary hearing on that
issue since it could have been raised at
appellant's trial or on appeal. . . .
Id.

The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and stated:
We explained further, in Brown v. Turner, 21
Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968), that "If the
contention of error is something which is
known or should be known to the party at the
time the judgment was entered, it must be
reviewed in the manner and within the time
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and is not subject
to further attack, except in some such
unusual circumstances as we have mentioned
above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure governing appeals and the
limitations of time specified therein would
be rendered impotent."
Waiver was found in Schad v. Turner, supra,
where the petitioner in a petition for habeas
corpus attempted to raise as an issue that the
District Attorney had exceeded the bounds of
propriety in his cross-examination of the
petitioner at the trial. We there observed that
since that was an issue which could have been
raised on the petitioner's former appeal of his
case to this Court, we would not take cognizance
of it on a later petition for habeas corpus.
If the appellant's counsel did in fact fail to
honor his request to challenge the juror, the
-13-

appellant had the adequate opportunity at the
trial to have made complaint to the court.
Furthermore, following his conviction that issue
could have been raised by him in this Court in his
appeal which pended in this Court for many months.
In view of his silence, the trial judge correctly
ruled that he had waived any claim of error in
this regard. There are not here any of the
"unusual circumstances" referred to in Bryant v.
Turner, supra.
Id.

Thus, this Court held that Hafen had waived review of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to
raise the issue at trial or while his direct appeal was pending.
In the present case, petitioner has claimed a violation
of his constitutional rights in that he alleges ineffective
assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, denial of access
to the courts and prejudice in his trial judge.

An examination

of these claims and allegations demonstrates that petitioner was
not denied due process nor would it be unconscionable to not reexamine his conviction.

Petitioner had different counsel at

trial and then during his appeal.

His appellate counsel raised

four issues, one involving ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to object to the giving of an "Allen" jury instruction,
two claiming that the trial court erred by giving the instruction
and by allowing a witness' preliminary hearing testimony to be
read into the record at trial, and one claiming that there was
insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict.
Petitioner's general claim on habeas that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance was raised on his direct appeal.
The appellate brief in the original case explored the allegation
that trial counsel and petitioner were at odds on the handling of
his case.

Petitioner presented an affidavit to this appellate
-14-

court listing the conflicts that he claims to have had with trial
counsel.

This Court stated in its decision on that appeal that

petitioner's contentions were rejected for two reasons:
First, it is based almost entirely on selfserving affidavits that are not part of the
record. For obvious reasons, we cannot
accept after-the-fact claims that there was a
conflict with counsel, unless the defendant
has made his disagreement with counsel
apparent on the record.
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).

The second

reason given for rejecting petitioner's claim was that trial
counsel's decision to accept the "Allen" charge was trial
strategy and within counsel's prerogative to decide.

Id.

POINT II
THE HABEAS COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS
TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE.
As in petitioner's appeal, on habeas review he asked
the District Court, and asks this Court now to review matters
which are not in the record of the trial or the habeas
evidentiary hearing.

At the evidentiary hearing in the District

Court, he did not present testimony nor evidence but merely
argued his position and made statements to the court about his
habeas claims (Habeas R. 264). Subsequently he submitted to the
habeas court several "Supplemental Traverses" and "Affidavits"
which evidently were intended to replace his deficiency in not
presenting evidence at the hearing (Habeas R. 267-284, 286-370).
None of the "traverses" or "affidavits" carry the weight of
evidence nor do they raise matters which were not or could not
have been raised on petitioner's direct appeal.
-15-

Petitioner's specific claims of ineffectiveness raised
in his habeas petition were that trial counsel failed to conduct
an investigation which would have shown that 1) the officers
searched a Monte Carlo instead of a Chevelle or Malibu, 2) Myers
was not a credible witness because his claims that he had served
in the military, that he was starting his own business, that he
worked for a firm in Omaha, Nebraska called "New Energy
Consultants", that he had only met the victim for the first time
that day, that he had never been convicted of a felony, and that
he had walked to the bus depot and waited five minutes before
calling police were false, and 3) Archuleta was not a credible
witness because he had a "vendetta" against petitioner's family.
The specific claim that trial counsel was deficient
because she failed to conduct pretrial investigation is not
supported by the trial record.

The trial record shows that trial

counsel called the Chief Investigator of the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association as a witness to testify as to the time it
would have taken Myers to walk from the scene of the shooting to
the bus depot (Trial R. 589-595).

His testimony directly

challenged the credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness,
Rickey Myers.

Another investigator from the Salt Lake Legal

Defenders Association, Gilbert Ramirez, testified as to efforts
to locate Myers' employer and failing to find the business Myers
had given as his employer (Trial R. 585). This also was a direct
challenge to Myers' credibility.

Trial counsel proffered, with

the stipulation of the prosecution, the testimony of an agent of
the Department of the Army to the effect that the Department had
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searched and had not found any record of Myers having served in
the Army (Trial R. 656). Obviously, pretrial investigation was
done and trial counsel used the information gleaned from that
investigation to challenge the credibility of Myers on crossexamination (Trial R. 432-34).

Petitioner's claim that other

investigation could or should have been done or that further
investigation would have changed the outcome of the trial is not
supported by the record.
As to petitioner's claims that Myers lied when he
testified as to starting his own business, that he only met the
victim for the first time that day, and that he had never been
convicted of a felony, petitioner has not shown any of those
statements to be false.

There is no evidence to disprove Myers'

claim that he was starting his own business and the trial record
doesn't say (as petitioner claims) that the new business was a
trucking company (Trial R. 379). Myers said only that he was in
the process of starting his own business, then answered the
prosecutor's question about what type of business he was
typically in by saying "Trucking" (Trial R. 379). Petitioner
seeks to challenge Myers' statement that he had only met the
victim that day by citing to an affidavit by his wife, Ruth
Medina, which is appended to his Brief but does not appear in the
record of his habeas petition.

That affidavit is without merit.

Mrs. Medina allegedly quotes an Assistant Attorney General as
saying that everyone knew that Myers and the victim had hung out
together and that Myers had criminal records in Utah and
elsewhere.

There is no evidence to that effect from Bernard
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Tanner, an Assistant Attorney General working in the Tax and
Business Regulations Division.

Mr. Tanner may have made those

statements to Mrs. Medina but they are not proof that Myers was
lying.

There is no evidence that Mr. Tanner has personal

knowledge of Myers' supposed criminal history and these
statements fly in the face of the sworn testimony of Officer John
Johnson who testified that a criminal history of Myers was
obtained and showed that he had no convictions in Utah nor
warrants from other states (Trial R. 496, 506, 508). There also
was no evidence provided that Myers and the victim had known each
other before March 31, 1984. Most of these issues were
thoroughly explored and challenged by trial counsel at trial and
were also raised by petitioner on his direct appeal and found to
be without merit.

There was no new evidence before the habeas

court which supports petitioner's claim that Myers was lying
under oath.
Petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective
because the officers allegedly searched the wrong car is also
without merit.

Trial counsel was not present when petitioner

gave consent for the search of his car nor when the officers
conducted the search.

While there is no testimony as to how the

officers decided which car belonged to petitioner, it is
difficult to believe that petitioner did not have some input as
to which car was his.

It is absurd to believe that the officers

merely picked out a car at random near petitioner's house and
searched it without establishing petitioner's possessory
interest.

Something or someone must have directed them to the

black Monte Carlo as belonging to petitioner.

It is interesting

to note that petitioner did not raise this discrepancy in the
cars at the time of trial.

The officers clearly testified that

they searched a black Chevrolet Monte Carlo (Trial R. 479, 516).
Petitioner's relatives and friends testified that he drove a
black Chevrolet Chevelle (Trial R. 254-60), although Gilbert
Najera testified that petitioner had a couple of cars and he
didn't know which car petitioner drove that night.

The

prosecutor asked if Najera saw any cars described as a "black
Chevrolet Super sport Chevelle" and Najera replied that he
"didn't pay any attention to any Camaro" (Trial R. 362-63).
Petitioner himself testified that he was driving his 1972 black
Chevelle (Trial R. 607) but then identified the registration for
a Chevelle Malibu for introduction into evidence (Trial R. 608).
After being present in court and hearing the testimony that the
car searched was a Monte Carlo, petitioner never said that the
bullet was not found in his car, either at trial or on appeal.
Instead, he presented evidence from a cousin that the bullet may
have come from a target shooting incident earlier in the year
(Trial R. 595-99).

Petitioner testified himself as to the target

shooting claim (Trial R. 630, 636-39) but never raised the issue
of the wrong car being searched.

It is possible for the jury to

have believed that the Chevelle car model and the Monte Carlo
were similar and the confusion was only in the name and not in
whether the car searched was petitioner's.

The names of Monte

Carlo, Chevelle, Malibu and Camaro were all given at one time or
the other at the trial.

The fact that Myers saw petitioner shoot
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the victim was sufficient evidence to convict petitioner even if
there was confusion about the make of the car.
Petitioner's attempt through the "affidavits11 of Mark
Velarde to "prove" that the car searched was not petitioner's
must fail.

Again, these "affidavits" are not evidence and, even

if they were, they really don't tell the court anything.
changes his "affidavits" as time goes on.

Velarde

In the March 14, 1988,

"affidavit" he said that the Monte Carlo must belong to a friend
of his whom he does not want to name, but who supposedly told him
that his car was searched on the morning of April 1, 1984. On
April 3, 1988, his "affidavit" says that he would have testified
for petitioner at his trial that he, Velarde, is "almost 100%
sure" that his friend's Monte Carlo was parked in front of
petitioner's home.

It is interesting that Velarde supposedly

remembers this after four years and when he claims not to have
known petitioner at the time that the search took place.

Velarde

appears to be a prison crony of petitioner's who now remembers an
occurrence of four years ago when this "memory" can help
petitioner.
The claim that further pretrial investigation of Eli
Archuleta, the State's rebuttal witness, would have produced a
different result in the trial is also without merit.

Archuleta

was presented the last day of trial because he was not found
until that time.

When his presence was known, petitioner's trial

counsel asked for, and received, time to speak with Archuleta
(Trial R. 661). She spoke to him for 25-35 minutes which she
indicated was plenty of time (Trial R. 661-62).

She was able to

effectively challenge Archuleta's testimony as he testified that
he was on felony parole (Trial R. 663, 673) and that he had been
granted immunity for testifying (Trial R. 664, 673-75).

His

confusion about when he had sold the gun to petitioner was
thoroughly explored at trial and on petitioner's direct appeal.
In addition, petitioner's trial counsel called a surrebuttal
witness, a friend of petitioner's, who testified to the supposed
-vendetta" against petitioner's family by Archuleta (Trial R.
683).

Calling other witnesses, such as Leonard Fernandez,

petitioner's cousin and author of another "affidavit" (Habeas R.
283-84), would have been merely cumulative and not added any
substance to the vendetta claim.
Petitioner presents an "affidavit" of Ronald Craig
Warren, another prison buddy (Habeas R. 363-70).

This

"affidavit" purports to prove that Archuleta admitted lying on
the stand in petitioner's trial.

The happenstance of Warren

being housed next to petitioner, then next to Archuleta, then
back with petitioner is very fortuitous, to say the least.

The

"affidavit" does not say that Archuleta said that he was lying,
only the "he knew he was in the wrong for doning (sic) it. . . ."
That statement, if it really was made, could just as easily have
meant that Archuleta was remorseful for testifying, having to
"rat on", petitioner.

The "affidavit" is not proof that

Archuleta lied.
Petitioner next claims ineffective assistance by
appellate counsel because they allegedly neglected to notice
these problems and raise them on appeal. As has been discussed,
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appellate counsel did raise most of these issues on direct appeal
and any other claims now raised by petitioner are without merit•
POINT III
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMED BY
PETITIONER EITHER DID NOT OCCUR OR IS NOT IN
THE RECORD TO ALLOW THIS COURT TO REVIEW.
Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by using perjured testimony.

As the basis for his

claim he raises the same issues as addressed in Point II above.
As discussed there, petitioner has not proven that either Myers
or Archuleta were lying.

Without that proof, he has not shown

that the prosecutor knew or should have known that these
witnesses were lying.

On the issue of Myers' alleged criminal

record, it would also have to be shown that the officers who ran
the check on his history were lying and that the prosecutor knew
or should have known that they were.

There is no evidence that

that is the case.
The allegation that the prosecutor injected
impermissible racial slurs into his closing argument has no basis
in the record.

The closing arguments were not transcribed (which

petitioner claims was also ineffective assistance) so this Court
has no evidence before it that error occurred during closing
argument.

Petitioner submits with his brief a newspaper clipping

which reports the closing arguments in the case.

Even in the

clipping there is no quote from the prosecutor calling petitioner
a "macho Mexican1*.

The article paraphrases the prosecutor as

saying that "Medina was being macho with his friends the night of
the party,"

The defense counsel is paraphrased as saying that

"the prosecuting attorney had portrayed Medina as being macho
just because he is Mexican.

'Being Mexican doesn't necessarily

mean being macho.'" (Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 8).

None of

this is evidence that the prosecutor called petitioner a "macho
Mexican" as he alleges.

Given petitioner's misquotes from the

trial transcript throughout his brief when he had that transcript
in front of him, this Court should not accept his claim that the
prosecutor made any such statement.
Petitioner also alleges that the prosecutor
intentionally concealed the make of the car searched until after
trial and that trial counsel was in collusion with the prosecutor
to conceal that information from petitioner.
specious.

This argument is

The trial transcript clearly states the testimony

about the model of the car searched and petitioner was present at
trial and could hear the testimony of those witnesses.

It can

also be assumed that that information was divulged to
petitioner's trial counsel as part of the police report given
during discovery and was never concealed from anyone.
POINT IV
THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HIS
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ARE EITHER DUPLICITOUS OR
ARE EQUALLY WITHOUT MERIT.
In his supplemental brief, petitioner raises many of
the same issues raised in his original brief; in fact, pages 3
through 11 are copies of petitioner's original brief.

The only

additional claims are that 1) petitioner's trial counsel was in
collusion with the prosecution, 2) petitioner was denied access
to the courts, and 3) the trial judge was prejudiced against
petitioner.
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The claim that petitioner's trial counsel was in
collusion with the prosecution is based on petitioner's claims
about lack of investigation, the closing arguments, and a claim
that trial counsel gave petitioner a bottle of whiskey during
trial which he drank.

He claims that while he was drunk his

attorney waived all of his rights regarding the "Allen" charge
against his wishes.

The first two claims are addressed above and

the last is not supported by any evidence.

The issue of the

supposed conflict between petitioner and counsel regarding the
"Allen" charge was rejected by this Court during petitioner's
direct appeal.
Petitioner was not denied his access to the courts but
was given his direct appeal and then was given an evidentiary
hearing on his habeas petition.

The fact that the habeas court

did not accept any of his arguments (he presented no evidence) at
the hearing did not deny him access to the court nor to due
process.

The habeas court heard his arguments and allowed him to

file his multitudinous "traverses" and "affidavits" even after
the hearing.

A reading of those filings clearly supports the

habeas court's findings that petitioner has not demonstrated
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel; has not
demonstrated any newly discovered evidence; has not demonstrated
an unfair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct; has not
demonstrated what exculpatory evidence the prosecutor allegedly
withheld; has not demonstrated that the prosecutor knowingly used
perjured testimony; and has not demonstrated any improper
statements by the prosecutor during closing arguments.

Petitioner's final additional allegation is that the
trial judge was prejudiced against him.

For the proposition, he

quotes Judge Frederick (Trial R. 548) implying that the court's
statement had something to do with the previous testimony about
the bullet found in petitioner's car.

The statement by Judge

Frederick was clearly referring to the discussion occurring at
that point about the State's request to present the preliminary
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness.

Read in context,

the statement does not show any prejudice on the part of Judge
Frederick.
Throughout his brief and supplemental brief, petitioner
misquotes, misconstrues and misunderstands the law and the
testimony given.

Neither his arguments at his habeas hearing nor

his supplemental filings with the court presented the evidence
that the court needed if it were to rule in petitioner's favor.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and any information which may
be brought out on oral argument, the State asks this Court to
affirm the sentencing of the lower court.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

Q}'

day of February,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

GU

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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